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Abstract. This study analyses contemporary global climate governance rep-
resented by the case of REDD+, and how Swedish environmental movement 
organizations (EMOs) participate and/or resist this governance. The aim of 
the study is to provide a detailed account of contemporary global climate 
governance and EMOs participation and/or resistance using the theoretical 
perspective of governmentality, which gives the possibility to distinguish the 
rationalities and technologies used in climate governance, and to identify 
different levels of participation and resistance by the EMOs. The major ra-
tionality identified in global climate governance is marketization that perme-
ates programme proposals. Marketization is understood as an expression of 
advanced liberal governing, transforming political responsibilities into mar-
ket principles and emphasizing active, responsible and accountable actors in 
the pursuit of personal fulfilment. Other important rationalities are scientiza-
tion and managerialization and all three rationalities are reciprocally con-
nected. The resistance of the EMOs is mostly directed against the marketiza-
tion of global climate governance, which is seen as a threat to political and 
democratic influence. However, some of the EMOs resistance can simultane-
ously be interpret as participation. By taking part in technocratic argumenta-
tions, EMOs legitimatize and underpin the importance of certain forms of 
knowledge and perspectives in global climate governance. 
 
Keywords: climate change, global governance, REDD+, governance, envi-
ronmental organization, environmental movement, governmentality, power, 
resistance, participation, advanced liberal governing, neo-liberalism, man-
agement, science, technology,  
Introduction	  
Climate change emerged into the broader public sphere during the late 1980s 
when issues such as the ozone layer and biodiversity environmental issues 
became more global. At this time, climate change was considered as only one 
of many environmental concerns, even after the 1997 Kyoto protocol which 
specifically dealt with global carbon emissions (Anshelm, 2012, p. 11; 
Jamison, 2001, p. 93). Research into the Swedish environmental movement 
(EM) in the 1990s shows that the climate issue still had not yet become the 
overriding issue (Boström, 2001). Despite warnings from the Intergovern-
mental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and environmental movement or-
ganizations (EMOs), it was not until the mid 2000s that the Swedish climate 
debate heated up and even reached apocalyptic dimensions. Several things 
contributed such as the Stern Report that dealt with the costs of climate 
change, Al Gores film An Inconvenient Truth and the IPCCs 4th report that 
expressed great concerns about the climate change. The climate change issue 
caused conflicts to resurface surrounding fundamental values about economic 
growth, the relation between politics and markets, lifestyles and consump-
tion, global justice and the role of technology and science (Anshelm, 2012, 
pp. 12–17).    
   During this period, from the 1980s and onwards, the EM also faced politi-
cal changes. In the 1980s, neo-liberal ideology spread and influenced envi-
ronmental politics by translating political responsibilities into market solu-
tions. The EMOs were directed more towards professional environmentalism 
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with an advisory role to business and governments and the establishment of 
green parties institutionalized environmental issues (Jamison, 2001, pp. 91, 
92, 2003, p. 708). These processes continued during the 1990s and discourses 
such as ecological modernization that wanted to combine economic growth 
with ecological concerns and technological improvements for the environ-
ment became influential. This lead to a certain degree of de-radicalization 
and differentiation of the EM (Boström, 2001, pp. 289, 297; Jamison, 2001, 
p. 96).  
   There has been little research conducted about Swedish EMOs during the 
2000s regarding their relation to climate change and global climate govern-
ance. In order to understand Swedish EMOs and their relation to global cli-
mate governance this study will use the case of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) that was initiated in 2005 at the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
COP11 meeting in Montreal. It was presented as a way for developing coun-
tries outside the Kyoto protocol to take part in carbon emission mitigations. 
In 2007 at the COP13 meeting in Bali it was formally introduced into the 
Bali Action Plan where it got its official definition of purpose:  
 
(...) reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries (...) (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 6).  
 
 
REDD+ is not yet fully finalised but the main idea is a performance-based 
compensation payment system for actions taken to avoid deforestation and 
forest degradation. It has become an anticipated component in the post-Kyoto 
climate policy field and has received broad support, not only from UNFCCC 
but also from non-state actors (Stephan, 2012, p. 621). REDD+ is interesting 
since it highlights many of those questions that the climate change debate in 
the mid 2000s brought forward. 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse global climate governance from a gov-
ernmentality perspective. More specifically the purpose of the study is to 
distinguish and analyse the rationalities and technologies in the context of 
REDD+, and to identify Swedish EMOs relationship to these rationalities and 
technologies. The research questions are: 
 
What rationalities and technologies can be discerned within REDD+ pro-
posals? In what ways do Swedish EMOs participate and/or resist to rationali-
ties and technologies connected to REDD+? 
 
Previous	  research	  
Previous research can be divided into two areas. The first is concerned with 
how climate change governance is made possible; how certain aspects are 
made thinkable and governable through different forms of knowledge and 
expertise. The second area deals with the development of the environmental 
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movement on a global and Swedish national level. Both areas are important 
for the purpose of this study, as articulated in the research questions. 
 
Climate	  change	  governance	  
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) identify three overarching discourses (each 
with slightly different shades) in global climate governance and examine how 
they are expressed in treaty texts, NGO and business policies and scientific 
reports connected to tree planting projects (CDM projects) aiming to increase 
carbon sequestration in tropical forests. Two of the three discourses are con-
sidered dominant in global climate governance: Ecological Modernization 
(EMod) emphasizes a liberal market order with innovative technology in-
vestments as a method to achieve both economic growth and sustainable de-
velopment. According to Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, EMod has been widely 
embraced by organizations like UNEP, FAO and the World Bank as a ra-
tionale for future actions. Green Environmentalism (GE) is resting upon sci-
ence, where knowledge and expertise are intrinsically linked to the scientific 
management of life, including the natural environment (Bäckstrand & Lö-
vbrand, 2006, pp. 3, 5). Experts have provided scientific and administrative 
rationales for measuring and certifying carbon and this has become a prereq-
uisite in climate governance. Although sometimes in conflict, EMod and GE 
are mutually reinforcing each other and their dominant role in framing global 
climate policies (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, pp. 67–69). The third dis-
course is Civic Environmentalism (CE) which has two alignments divided by 
their view on the role of the state and capitalistic economy. The reformative 
wing talk about the importance of civil society participation as a complement 
to state practices and promotes public-private partnerships between NGOs, 
business and governments in reaching result-based problem-solving. The 
radical part is very sceptical to the promises of stakeholder participation. In-
stead, they propose a fundamental transformation of consumption patterns 
and existing institutions towards a just world order. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 
write that CE represents a critical counter-discourse that challenges the sup-
posed benefits of sustainable development found in EMod and the manageri-
al ambitions in GE (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, pp. 56, 69).  
   Other research on climate governance looks more specifically at the com-
modification processes in climate governance. Stephan (2012) applies eco-
nomic sociology and discourse analysis to show how carbon, or avoided de-
forestation is made into a commodity in REDD+. Stephan analyses how un-
certainties concerning measurements for managing a carbon market are made 
invisible and instead constructed as unambiguous facts so that forests may 
function on a market as a commodity (see also Paterson & Stripple, 2012), 
and how agents like UNFCCC and IPCC are key actors in processes of paci-
fying contestations about measurement approaches. Stephan argues that alt-
hough there is no formal decision on REDD+, there are tendencies of dis-
course closure on controversial issues which may lead to REDD+ becoming 
integrated in a carbon market. Stephan also looks at how the carbonification 
of forests alter and limit other perspectives and values connected to forests 
and that this may contradict claims about multiple benefits of REDD+, such 
as biodiversity. Lövbrand and Stripple (2012) have looked at similar process-
es where carbon markets are made into thinkable and governable domains, 
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and also how these processes reflect a changing rationality of government; 
where the civil society goes from being a passive receiver for interventions to 
an entity that is both an object and a subject for governance.    
 
Environmental	   movements:	   responsibilization,	   institutionalization	  
and	  counter	  actions	  
Boström's thorough study of six Swedish EMOs during the 1990s tries to 
understand the Swedish EM and its diversity, their political actions, the effect 
of their organizational structure and their cognitive actions. The part that is 
interesting for this study connects with governmentality and self-regulation. 
Boström wonders if one can talk about a paradigm shift in environmental 
governance that aims to support self-regulation among agents; a shift of re-
sponsibility from the political field to the civil society and the EMOs. In his 
interviews, some EM representatives say there is a tendency for politicians to 
"leave the playground" and hope for voluntary forces in public society. The 
EMOs are attributed the role of putting pressure on corporations or creating 
public pressure for firmer laws. This leads to less binding decisions being 
made and more voluntary procedural management in environmental issues. 
An EM representative speculates on why and one reason could be the relative 
success of bringing environmental issues into everyday practices such as 
consumer power, or that the operating freedom for environmental politics is 
limited in a globalized world, e.g. global economic competition may put 
pressure on environmental taxes. Another reason could be an ideological cri-
tique of the welfare state. The limits of traditional politics infer a turn to sub-
politics for the EM, i.e. actions aimed directly towards market actors with 
recommendations, collaborations and proposals of voluntary actions, and 
where ecological concerns have to be translated into economical terms (Bos-
tröm, 2001, pp. 200–204, 237, 245).     
   Jamison (Jamison, 2001, 2003) describes a shift in discussing environmen-
tal problems, from protection and particular improvements to the integration 
of environmental issues to all areas of society, an intellectual and cognitive 
greening of society where dominant agents emphasizing economic efficiency 
and rationality, have tried to incorporate environmental concerns into its own 
established modes of operation. As a result, the EM has become more differ-
entiated and more professionalized according to Jamison. Some EMOs have 
become mainstream organizations and incorporated into political cultures. 
They have become more like institutions than movements and are mainly 
concerned with influencing policies, laws and agreements (Jamison, 2001, p. 
158). Other EMOs have chosen a more radical approach and are more con-
cerned with cultural change. Morality, ethics, ideological and utopian content 
is important in articulating resistance. The common denominator among this 
group is a resistance against global capitalism (Jamison, 2001, p. 181). 
Jamison is more critical to the differentiation of the EM than Boström. Activ-
ism according to Jamison has become increasingly like any other business. 
The professional environmentalists have pursued their own organizational 
goals without any broader political and social strategy. The radicals on the 
other hand have become defenders of the past and particular values and dis-
regard the need for compromises. Jamison wishes that the EM could articu-
late a more coherent political program.  
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   Thörn et al (Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming) are, as 
Jamison, interested in processes of incorporation and resistance but they call 
it institutionalization and anti-institutionalization of the EM. They look at 
EMOs' strategies in the global context and the meaning of Climate Justice in 
the environmental movement. They agree that there are global institutionali-
zation processes going on in the environmental movement but at the same 
time counter actions. After the disappointment of COP15 there is a growing 
anti-institutionalization movement with the emergence of new networks, like 
the Climate Justice Network, which brings more systemic critique to the en-
vironmental movement. There is also criticism aimed at parts of the EM for 
letting themselves being incorporated into pragmatically led official process-
es that depoliticize the climate issue. This criticism is often linked with issues 
like climate change and social inequality, often with a north-south perspec-
tive on the world. Climate Justice becomes a discursive nodal point that uni-
fies several EMOs and the expansion of global networks between EMOs 
from both the north and the south makes exchanges of ideas almost inevita-
ble. However, occurring simultaneously with globalisation is a refocus on 
national governments; the reason being the disappointment of international 
negotiation at COP.  
   The research above concentrates on either governmentality processes or 
social movement development and by combining these two perspectives this 
study can contribute by giving a more detailed picture of the relationship be-
tween global environmental governance and EMOs regarding resistance and 
participation, which has been lacking in governmentality studies (see Theory 
and Method below). 
 
Theory	  and	  Method	  
 
Governmentality	  and	  power	  
Miller and Rose write that government is a problematizing activity: 
 
By 'problematization' we mean the way in which experience comes 
to be organized so as to render something as a 'problem' to be ad-
dressed and rectified: interpretive schemes for codifying experi-
ence, ways of evaluating it in relation to particular norms, and 
ways of linking it up to wider social and economic concerns and 
objectives (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 175). 
 
 
It is in relation to these problems that programmes are created in order to 
adjust the depicted failings in society. They may take the form of government 
reports or proposals by other agents that seek to specify how domains might 
be configured and managed in desirable ways. Problematizations connect to 
particular norms and ways of thinking, or rationalities. Rationalities can be 
seen as idealised systems of thoughts or discourses that works as representa-
tions of reality and that provide reasons to act in specific ways. Rose and 
Miller say that rationalities "are morally coloured, grounded upon 
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knowledge, and made thinkable through language" (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 
277). Rationalities are often guided by ideals like justice, equity, and effi-
ciency. They also contain conceptions of the objects to be governed which 
could be the environment, the economy, the nation, or a community (Rose & 
Miller, 2010, pp. 276, 277). The tools used to realize rationalities are diverse 
technologies based on different forms of knowledge and expertise that pro-
vide authoritative criteria for decision and actions. These can be audits and 
evaluations, scientific calculations and measurements, standardized systems 
and best practices, and the use of expert vocabularies. Knowledge and ex-
perts are key aspects in making government possible and by transforming 
phenomena into information, reality is made stable, comparable and rendered 
in a form that can be diagnosed. Information is not a collection of objective 
facts but a device in itself to act upon the real in such a way as to make it 
amenable to calculation and evaluation in accordance with what is considered 
normal, healthy, desirable, efficient, moral etc. (Rose & Miller, 2010, pp. 
273, 283). This way, subjects are encouraged to reflect on both their current 
position and the desirable position and are then provided guidance on how to 
adjust themselves according to the latter. Together with the legitimacy of 
experts it is possible to foster "self-organizing capacities of the civil society" 
(Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 277). This is the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 
2008, p. 186).  
   Governmentality theory shows that contemporary governance cannot be 
understood as a single sovereign power exercising its will on the subjects. 
States do not possess the resources or knowledge to govern complex societies 
or international processes. Power is better understood as assemblages of 
knowledge and expertise that have coinciding and shared interests, where the 
state is only one of several agents. These assemblages can then become stabi-
lized through the development of common modes of perceptions and the ma-
terialization of common ways to document, calculate, measure and evaluate 
(Rose & Miller, 2010, pp. 277,281,  282). These assemblages define contem-
porary governance that differs from previous forms of centralized govern-
ment (Larsson, Letell, & Thörn, 2012, p. 16). Global environmental govern-
ance is a good example of dispersion of power, which makes governmentality 
a useful theoretical tool for analysing more specifically the processes in con-
temporary global climate governance. 
 
Governmentalities	  -­‐	  thinking	  and	  doing	  governance	  
The processes for conducting others can be described as governmentalities, 
i.e. different ways of thinking and doing governance. Rose and Miller have 
identified different forms of governmentalities in different periods, each be-
ing a response to earlier forms. They write that from the mid-seventies and 
onwards neo-liberal thinkers started criticizing the welfare state for govern-
ment overload, inefficiency and for creating dependency among citizens with 
welfare programs. Neo-liberalism "reactivates", as Rose and Miller say, lib-
eral principles with its doubts about state interferences for governing effi-
ciently. Aspects that formerly were understood as political responsibilities are 
to be transformed into commodified forms and regulated through markets 
(Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 296). Instead of a welfare provision of collective 
security and social solidarity neo-liberalism emphasizes an active self-
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governing agent in the pursuit of personal fulfilment through the discipline of 
competition in markets. The actors are conceived as subjects of responsibil-
ity, autonomy and choice and the way to govern them is by shaping and uti-
lizing their freedom. This is what Rose and Miller term advanced liberal 
governing (ALG) (Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 212–215). This is governmental-
ity analysis applied to contemporary governance, a contextualization that is 
useful for the analysis in this study.  
 
Governmentality	  -­‐	  resistance	  and	  participation	  
The analytical focus in governmental studies often seems to be on alliances 
with authorities and other actors and thereby underestimates resistance and 
power struggles. This is why scholars have pointed out the need for an in-
creased focus on resistance in governmental studies (Larsson et al., 2012, p. 
11; Oels, 2005, p. 193; Death, 2010, p. 239). Power is never absolute and one 
can always find ways to destabilize power. Counter-conduct is a struggle 
against processes applied for conducting others and a symptom of a crisis of 
governmentality which helps to make visible both social conflicts and the 
rationalities and technologies surrounding them (Foucault, 2007, pp. 268, 
504; Dean, 2010, p. 49).  
   EMOs might resist in their own self-assumed role as representatives or de-
fenders of agents and things that are themselves objects of governance, such 
as the environment and indigenous people with no say in the environmental 
debate (Jamison, 2001, p. 161). In addition, the global scale of environmental 
problems can be seen as circumstances affecting all of us. EMOs' resistance 
could be the experience of a necessary self defence, the need of resisting 
dominant ideas and practices in which we all take part and instead creating 
spaces for other ways of thinking (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, p. 120). It is also 
possible that EMOs resist on different levels. It could be criticism on a sys-
temic level where dominant structures are questioned (Lilja & Vinthagen, 
2014, p. 120) or they might criticise specific technologies. This would say 
something about their degree of institutionalization.   
   There are no such things as pure antagonistic organizations (Melucci, 1996, 
p. 36) and EMOs do not only resist but also participate in governance. EMOs 
take part in of networks, or assemblages of knowledge and contribute as 
knowledge providers to governments (Boström, 2001, pp. 206, 216; Thörn, 
Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming). Resistance can simultaneous-
ly be viewed as participation. By engaging in technocratic or economic ar-
gumentations, the EMOs legitimate and reinforce certain forms of knowledge 
and perspectives in climate governance:  
 
Secondly, protests, just as much as regimes of government, pre-
sume or reify certain regimes of knowledge (Death, 2010, p. 241) 
 
Governmentality	  and	  Method	  
Governmentality has a discursive character. All forms of government are 
using language for making representations that claims to describe the nature 
of a reality. By defining reality, through discursive mechanisms, it is made 
thinkable and thereby amenable to deliberations and actions. The way objects 
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of government are articulated and the way they are construed are linguistic 
elements that make up the rationalities of government. In this way language 
can be seen as an intellectual technology (Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 29–31). 
The discursive perspective means that this analysis is not concerned with the 
truth - who is right or who is wrong in relation to facts - but rather to describe 
global climate governance as a field of contestation and how knowledge, ide-
als, moral and language are used in the processes of creating reality and 
meaning in relation to climate governance.  
   On a concrete level the analysis starts by identifying themes in order to 
understand on a large scale which domains and areas in the REDD+ debate 
are emphasized, both by advocators and sceptics. The analytical concepts 
derived from the empirical material are then analysed with theoretical con-
cepts that further develop new analytical concepts derived from the empirical 
material. There is a constant movement back and forth between analytical 
concepts derived from the empirical material and theory. In identifying ra-
tionalities and technologies one look for regularities (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 
276) in problem definitions, descriptions of means and ends, what knowledge 
they rest on, conceptions of the objects governed, how language is used in 
connecting concepts and ideals and how all this creates meaning and legiti-
macy. Equally important is to identify what discursive statements hide. These 
regularities are understood as reflecting a specific governmentality. The same 
method is used in identifying resistance. It is important not to simplify by 
suggesting two competing discourses. Although being an area of contesta-
tion, the positions taken by agents towards global climate governance is more 
complicated than that and different discursive elements are at play at differ-
ent levels (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008, p. 381).  
 
Selection	  of	  case	  and	  empirical	  material	  
REDD+ as a case is interesting for two reasons. First, it has become a central 
element in global climate change governance (Stephan, 2012) and secondly, 
it is interesting because of its unsettled form. There is no final decision yet 
about the layout of REDD+, which makes it a very dynamic field for investi-
gating discourse development in global environmental governance.  
   There are several agents engaged in the development of REDD+ so further 
selection is needed. The UN-REDD programme1 is a good candidate since it 
is one of the major actors in REDD+ development. It is part of the UN and 
works to implement decisions made within UNFCCC at COP16 and it has a 
close partnership with other important actors in international development 
and climate management like the World Bank (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 1). The 
UN-REDD programme is also interesting since it focuses on many areas dis-
cussed by the environmental movement: the connection between global and 
local, developmental issues, equity, rights of indigenous people, and the 
commodification of nature.  
                                                
1 UN-REDD was created in 2008 to assist developing countries in building 
capacity to participate in future REDD+ mechanisms. It consists of three UN 
agencies; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 1). 
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   The selection of Swedish EMOs is made because of a lack of research on 
their relation to contemporary global climate governance policies. The EMOs 
are The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) and Friends of the 
Earth Sweden (FoE) and they are chosen because of their differences. SSNC 
are to a high degree professionalized and institutionalized. They have exten-
sive employment of staff and experts, and regular consultations with political 
officials. They are also described as being more pragmatically oriented (Bos-
tröm, 2001, p. 72; Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming). 
FoE on the other hand is a smaller organisation, less professionalized and is 
sometimes described as being more confrontational and more ideologically 
minded than SSNC (Boström, 2001, p. 72). Unfortunately, Greenpeace Swe-
den (Scandinavia) did not have enough empirical material related to REDD+.  
   The empirical material for UN-REDD consists of policy documents con-
cerning REDD+ and were mainly found on the UN-REDD website. Search 
words were "REDD" and "REDD+". The empirical material for the EMOs is 
made up of policy documents and articles found in member magazines and 
on their websites2 mentioning "REDD" or "REDD+" and policies on climate 
change. The empirical material is both in Swedish and in English and quota-
tions originally in Swedish is translated by myself, to the best of my ability 
and with great concern about the meaning of the text.   
 
Results	  
Three dominant rationalities have been identified in the UN-REDD proposals 
for REDD+: marketization, managerialization and scientization. The con-
cepts are borrowed from research that, interestingly, identifies similar pro-
cesses in global AIDS aid governance, as found here in global climate gov-
ernance (Follér, Haug, Knutsson, & Thörn, 2013). The technologies connect-
ed to marketization are commodification; translation devices; entrepreneuri-
al training and economic incentives. Scientization is realised by technologies 
such as measurements, quantifications and monitoring; reporting standards 
and methodological guidance; and methodological and technological train-
ing. Finally, managerialization is connected to technologies like guidelines 
and assessments; and capacity building. Under each rationality, follows a 
presentation about resistance and participation by the EMOs.  
 
The	  rationality	  of	  marketization	  
To understand the development of REDD+ and its rationalities and technolo-
gies it has to be contextualized in relation to societal processes and the dis-
courses that drive them.  Rose and Miller write that from the mid-seventies 
and onwards neo-liberal analyses have received more support. The view is 
that political regulations and political responsibilities are better handled by 
market principles, which reflects a neo-liberal scepticism against the capaci-
ties of political authorities to govern. Transforming political responsibilities 
into markets and letting active agents maximising their own interests makes it 
                                                
2 Some documents from FoE were linked from the Swedish website to FoE 
international website.  
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more efficient according to this view (Rose & Miller, 2010, pp. 296, 298). 
This neo-liberal governmentality or ALG is apparent in UN-REDD articula-
tions. 
   By looking at UN-REDDs problematization, which is a key activity in gov-
ernmentality (Dean, 2010, p. 38; Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 29, 61), we can 
understand their reasoning and justification of a marketization of forests. The 
problem with current environmental governing according to UN-REDD is an 
inaccurate understanding about the "true economic value of forests" (UNEP, 
2011a, p. 15): 
 
Forests suffer from multiple market failures in that neither the ben-
efits that they produce nor the costs of their destruction are visible 
in economic terms (UNEP, 2011a, p. 8). 
 
 
Apart from timber, forests also produce public goods such as carbon seques-
tration, water regulation, water purification, soil stability and biodiversity, all 
referred to as eco-system services. They also produce non-timber products as 
medicine plants, food and energy for over 1 billion people, mostly in poor 
developing countries according to UN-REDD (UNEP, 2011b, p. 156). Since 
traditional markets do not capture many of these eco-system services and 
products, they are not considered in forest management. Landholders and 
businesses receive no reward for providing these services and consequently, 
according to UN-REDD, they opt for maximum return with short-term bene-
fits, e.g. by harvesting forests (UNEP, 2011a, p. 8, 2011b, pp. 156, 185). Alt-
hough described as market failures the remedy that UN-REDD proposes is 
not less markets but more markets and markets that are more efficient. That 
in turn will create economic incentives to leave the forests standing. This is 
similar to other proponents of neo-liberal discourse saying that: 
 
(...) capitalism has failed to deal adequately with environmental 
problems, because it has not been capitalist enough (Jamison, 
2001, p. 96).  
 
 
This is the rationality of marketization in UN-REDD proposals and it perme-
ates programme design proposals.  
 
Commodification	  of	  forests	  and	  translation	  of	  objectives	  
Obviously, UN-REDD leans on economic knowledge and expertise in its 
proposals to a REDD+ programme but at the same time UN-REDD tries to 
expand its economic frame. Governmentalities consists of both practical and 
intellectual technologies and the role of an intellectual technology is to influ-
ence our mentalities and to make reality thinkable in a new way with new 
ideas and concepts (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 36). The challenge for UN-
REDD is to connect markets with forest goods and services not previously 
considered as commodities and making them perceivable as commercial 
products. UN-REDD looks on carbon and other forest benefits and tries to 
price them, which is a commodification of forests. By combining multiple 
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markets, the goal is that these services and products together can compete 
with unsustainable timber and palm oil (UN7, s. 41; UN2, s. 11). Another 
challenge is to connect this with ideals like sustainability, biodiversity and 
social equity. Language plays a decisive role in making the world amenable 
to actions (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 275) and UN-REDD presents the concept 
of green economy. Green economy works as a translation device (Rose & 
Miller, 2010, p. 282) between the former opposing ideas and objectives of 
economic growth and environmental concerns (Duit, 2002, p. 105). It is ar-
ticulated as a market innovation; something capable of revolutionizing sus-
tainable forest management by promising both economic growth, economic 
efficiency and carbon mitigation, biodiversity, sustainability and social equi-
ty (UNEP, 2011a, pp. 3, 11). UN-REDDs intention is to transform national 
economies and, eventually, the global economy in a way that can generate 
growth by green economic actions, and to make the benefits of this green 
economy more equally distributed (UNEP, 2014, p. 13). UN-REDD says it 
will change the patterns of investments and generate benefits "from basic 
livelihood to the arena of international finance" (UNEP, 2011a, p. 15). This 
frame expansion is not really about incorporating other forms of knowledge 
but rather making environmental ideals and developmental issues fit into 
economic models and ways of thinking. The amount of actors that are incor-
porating a green vocabulary are increasing and everyone adopts it to fit their 
interests (Jamison, 2001, pp. 17, 94). 
 
Entrepreneurial	  training	  and	  economic	  incentives	  	  
It is of course not enough to create new markets intellectually. They must 
also be materialized by active agents. UN-REDD estimates that US $30 bil-
lion per year is required to support performance based payments (UNEP, 
2014, p. 44) and private capital sources are estimated to provide more than 80 
per cent of the capital required for a transition to a low carbon economy 
(UNEP, 2011b, p. 595). UN-REDD says that: 
 
It seems likely that REDD+ will be successful in the long term only 
if the private sector finds sustainable forest management to be an 
attractive investment (UNEP, 2014, p. 30).  
 
 
UN-REDD encourages both governments and local communities in develop-
ing countries to become active, responsible and accountable economic entre-
preneurs and market actors in forest management. Governments still have the 
traditional role as the providers of solid governance: the rule of law, clear 
tenure and property rights. This will lower the risks for private sector invest-
ments (UNEP, 2011a, p. 14). The role as a decision maker is being replaced 
more by the role of a market actor. Governments are becoming buyers and 
sellers. As sellers, they need to make themselves attractive to private finance. 
UN-REDD says that governments should make a thorough analysis of possi-
ble barriers to doing business in sustainable forest management. Measures 
could involve the simplifying of tax systems, streamlining licensing proce-
dures and removal of agriculture subsidies (UNEP, 2011a, pp. 8, 11, 14, 
 13 
2014, p. 29). As buyers governments should look for the most competitive 
partners in forest management. UN-REDD writes that public funding: 
 
(...) should provide incentives to private sector activities in a com-
petitive manner that produces measurable results (...)" (UNEP, 
2014, p. 30).  
 
 
In this way, governments reinforce entrepreneurial thinking in other agents as 
well. NGOs are attributed the role of helping companies incorporating sus-
tainability and social responsibility into their "global business goals, deci-
sions and strategies" (UNEP, 2011a, p. 13). All agents participate in the gov-
ernance of each other towards a green economy.   
   To foster responsible and accountable economic actors it is vital to decide 
on who gets paid for what. Land tenure issues are therefore important and in 
UN-REDD they refer to local and indigenous communities (UN-REDD, 
2011a, p. 3). UN-REDD says that land tenure clarifications:  
 
(...) will determine accountability in the delivery of carbon stocks 
as well as the distribution of benefits from financial transfers from 
REDD+" (UNEP, 2014, p. 42).  
 
 
UN-REDD says that evidence from Indonesia indicate that land tenure secu-
rity is decisive in motivating communities to contribute to REDD+ goals 
(UNEP, 2011a, p. 10). It is also important for private financial investments. 
UN-REDD says that:  
 
lenders and investors will not (...) consider investing in REDD+ 
activities unless clear and undisputed ownership systems are in 
place" (UN-REDD, 2011a, p. 3).  
 
 
It is clear that governments are made responsible for attracting investors and 
also for governing other agents, through market discipline, so they will keep 
their competitive approach. The local communities are responsible and ac-
countable for providing carbon stocks in such a way that they can function in 
a market and thereby attract investors.    
   Social coordination in forest management, according to UN-REDD, is to be 
governed through markets by market actors. This will most certainly de-
politize forest management since market principles will limit what is politi-
cally possible. Political relationship is replaced by a market relationship and 
by using economic rationality as a coordinator for social actions, agents can 
be self-organized with no or little need of public and political debate on how 
to organize forest management. This is a transformation from the governmen-
tality of welfare to the governmentality of ALG. "Economic entrepreneurship 
is to replace regulation, as active agents seeking to maximise their own af-
fairs (...)" (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 296)  
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EMOs	  and	  marketization	  
Initially it could be useful to mention something about the EMOs general 
view on REDD+. Neither SSNC nor FoE expresses a total rejection of 
REDD+ as a tool in global climate governance but they have reservations. 
SSNC says that REDD+ can be a complement to strong commitments in in-
dustrialized countries to decrease their carbon emissions and that REDD+ 
must be founded on peoples needs (SSNC, 2011a, pp. 1, 2). FoE are more 
sceptical and says "there are many reasons to be extremely cautious about 
REDD" and this because of ethical concerns, methodological constrains and 
how REDD+ is developing in reality (FoE, 2010, p. 5). Both SSNC and FoE 
resist or express critique against marketization both on a rationality and tech-
nology level and, as will be shown, this can be viewed as both resistance and 
participation.   
  
Political	  responsibility	  versus	  economic	  interests	  
The EMOs describe a marketization of REDD+ as a shift of responsibility 
from developed countries to developing countries and from political influ-
ence to market influence. FoE says: 
 
There are numerous interlinked reasons to oppose market-based 
REDD, which is a fundamentally flawed initiative geared primarily 
to shifting responsibility for the climate crisis from the rich to the 
poor (FoE, 2011a, p. 6). 
 
 
FoE says that the prevailing view in REDD+ negotiations has been to secure 
financing within a carbon market, which creates an opportunity for developed 
countries to make cheap compensations for their own emissions instead of 
making investments in renewable energy and sustainable transport systems at 
home3 (FoE, 2011a, p. 6; Bernstad, 2009). Likewise, SSNC says that carbon 
markets is seen as a cheap way for industrialized countries to postpone the 
necessary adjustments of their own societies (SSNC, 2011a, p. 1). SSNC 
writes: 
 
Two years before the wracked climate meeting in Copenhagen 
2009, a new issue had climbed to the top of the agenda. The re-
sponsibility of industrialized countries for climate change got more 
and more in the dark while more attention was directed on green-




Solutions are usually aimed at where the problem is and the EMOs criticise 
the ideas in REDD+ that focus on constructing solutions for poor countries. 
This might suggest that the problem is about deforestation in developing 
countries. It is partly a discursive struggle about what is illuminated and what 
is obscured in REDD+ rationalities and technologies. By focusing on defor-
                                                
3 Buying carbon credits will compensate for own emissions.  
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estation in developing countries, the life-style and consumption patterns in 
developed countries gets less attention.  
 This resistance connects to the role of politics and markets in global climate 
governance. The EMOs' resistance is interpreted as a reaction against the 
processes of transforming political relationships into market relationships 
(Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 296). Even though the EMOs have expressed great 
disappointment about political institutions, as in the Warsaw COP19 walkout 
where they actually left the meeting (Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, 
forthcoming), they still seem to have a belief in politics as such as a field for 
social coordination. SSNC articulates the REDD+ debate as a conflict be-
tween what they consider real integrated needs, which is the development of 
solid political structures for protecting biodiversity and local communities, 
and single-minded market interests that reduce forests to carbon (SSNC, 
2011a, pp. 6, 26). SSNC clearly advocates political responsibility and wants 
to prioritize programmes and financing channels that are under the control 
and guidance of the UN system (SSNC, 2011a, p. 3). They want a publicly 
funded system4 that is partly financed by money contributions from industri-
alized countries and partly by income from auctions of emission rights that 
have previously been awarded free to companies. Other possibilities are fees 
on international flights or a carbon tax (SSNC, 2011c, p. 25). This does not 
mean that SSNC rejects market rationalities per se. SSNC is known for its 
focus on consumer power and eco-labelling5. What we eat, how we transport 
ourselves etc. are a part of what can be referred to as lifestyle politics. SSNCs 
emphasis on political institutions and lifestyle politics are not to be interpret-
ed as a contradiction. Lifestyle politics is rather an extension of the possibili-
ties to articulate limits of our lifestyles and to show global solidarity by iden-
tifying one self with the solidary consumer (Thörn, 2000, pp. 217, 218). 
SSNC are even positive to the EU carbon market (SSNC, 2011b, p. 9) but, 
compared to the market solution proposed in REDD+, the EU carbon market 
is a semi-market controlled by the EU and the member states (European 
Commission, 2013) which is more in line with welfare governmentality and 
Keynesian thinking. These ideas were also found in the Swedish public de-
bate on climate change (Anshelm, 2012, p. 90). FoE also defends the political 
stance against market forces. FoE has a decentralised or bottom-up view on 
politics and want to transfer power from the distant control by big corporates 
and banks to the local, and they want a strong movement composed by the 
environmental-, solidarity-, farmer-, worker-, indigenous- and feminist-
movement, ready to take the battle for system change instead of climate 
change6. FoE is more politically outspoken and says that society should be:  
 
founded on social, economic, gender and environmental justice and 
free from all forms of domination and exploitation, such as neolib-
eralism, corporate globalization, neo-colonialism and militarism 
(FoE, 2010, p. 2).  
                                                
4 Whether REDD should be financed through markets or public funding is 







FoE focuses more on life-form politics that compared to lifestyle politics 
concentrate on building alternatives to established institutions from bottom 
up rather than taking over or reforming governmental political power (Thörn, 
2000, pp. 218, 219). At the same time, they propose pragmatic and central-
ized solutions. FoE wants to finance global climate governance through pub-
lic funding and fiscal means. The funding is expected to come from rich 
countries. It is articulated in a justice context, as a repayment for historical 
carbon debts created by developed countries (FoE, 2010, p. 25; Möllersten, 
2009, p. 91). Another way to collect funding is taxes on financial transactions 
or fossil energy use (Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 20). Both FoE and 
SSNC resist the rationality of marketization in its ALG shape. For SSNC it is 
not about market principles per se. The problem is the limited political influ-
ence that a marketization of REDD+ brings, which is in line with ALG and 
its view on the limited role of politics and the expanded use of markets. For 
FoE, it is more an ideologically driven by anti-capitalism and anti-neo-
liberalism, and more connected to issues of global justice and power relations 
between North and South.  
   Both SSNC and FoE express a concern about future possibilities for politi-
cal influence in global climate governance. FoE says that even though there 
is no final decision on the layout of REDD+ in UNFCCC, there are several 
agents already active in pilot projects and preparations for REDD+. FoE de-
scribes it as a race for profitable opportunities including investors, banks (al-
so the World Bank7), companies like General Motors, Shell, Chevron Texaco 
and BP and carbon traders (FoE, 2010, pp. 14, 25). According to FoE, there 
is a strong corporate lobby supporting the expansion of a global carbon mar-
ket and their economic resources, expertise and influence combined with a 
side-stepping of the political process in UNFCCC may steer the development 
of REDD+ to their advantage, so that, when formal decisions are to be made, 
structures already exists that may affect the future shape of REDD+ (FoE, 
2011b, p. 1, 2010, p. 14; Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 26). This is what 
Rose and Miller call materialization of power (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 281) 
SSNC express a similar concern: 
 
Despite that REDD is a part of a UN process, the World Bank have 
already got a firm grip on the financial flows (SSNC, 2011a, p. 9) 
 
 
The EMOs articulate global climate governance as being highjacked by pow-
erful agents striving towards a marketization of REDD+.  
 
Participation	  in	  the	  economic	  discourse	  
When looking at the EMOs' view on marketization, it is hard to argue that 
they agree, support or participate in the economic development of REDD+, 
according to the dominant views in the REDD+ debate. However, this study 
                                                
7 The World Bank is one of UN-REDDs major partners in the development 
of the UN-REDD programme (UN-REDD, 2011b, pp. 1, 2) 
 17 
wants to problematize counter-conduct and ask if resistance is always re-
sistance. By identifying resistance on different levels, it is possible to make 
the seemingly obvious a bit more complicated.  
   On a technology level, the EMOs try to resist by leaning on the knowledge, 
concepts and reasoning used in the field of economics. Here the question of 
marketization is disconnected from its rationality and becomes a technical 
issue. By making the resistance technical and using economic concepts the 
EMOs participate in the economic discourse and reinforce the importance of 
applying economic knowledge, concepts and theories in the debate of global 
climate governance. SSNC discusses the appropriateness of using marginal 
costs as a tool for calculating the costs for REDD+. They also refer to reports 
from Rights and Resources Initiative and Swedish researchers showing that 
compensations for leaving forests standing can never compete with e.g. palm 
oil plantations (SSNC1, s. 10). Likewise, FoE argue that the price of carbon, 
as with any other commodity, is volatile and that forests would depend on the 
fluctuating prices of carbon, and that a carbon market could even create fi-
nancial emission bubbles when trading with derivatives connected to a car-
bon market (Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 19; Chan, 2009). The aim of the 
EMOs is probably to question the appropriateness of a carbon market but 
what they are questioning are different economic technologies, not the ra-
tionality. 
   This movement between levels can be understood in two ways. The first is 
that EMOs are strategic opportunists and will use any potential weak spot to 
argue against their opponents, regardless of what level they are focusing on. 
The most important factor argued by this study though is a strategic adapta-
tion to surrounding contexts in order to gain influence in governance. Acting 
only as an antagonistic organization would lead to the risk of being dismissed 
as a marginal counter-culture without any possibility of exercising influence 
in dominant structures (Melucci, 1996, p. 36). Miller and Rose express a sim-
ilar view: 
 
For to presume to govern seemed to require one to propose tech-
niques to intervene - or to be dismissed as a mere critic or philoso-
pher. In short, to become governmental, thought had to become 
technical (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 15). 
 
 
This is a constant dilemma for the EMOs. In order to gain influence more 
directly they have to attach to dominant structures and be able to translate 
their interest into language and forms of knowledge used in these dominant 
structures. Since the 1980s there has been a shift from a more radical and 
confronting approach from the EMOs, to presenting themselves as "realistic, 
responsible and professional" (Boström, 2001, p. 80). At the same time they 
risk becoming technocratic, institutionalized and loosing their fundamental 
organisational ideas.  
 
The	  rationality	  of	  scientization	  
Scientization refers to the rationality of how science and experts are used in 
governance as providers of knowledge and technologies to make the world 
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manageable, and as providers of truth and objectivity. Science and experts are 
portrayed as carriers of neutrality beyond the subjectivity of politics and con-
flicts. Rational knowledge also brings promises of accuracy and effectivity. 
UN-REDD says that responses to address the challenges presented by climate 
change should be supported with "sound scientific approaches" (UN-REDD, 
2013a, p. 1).  
 
Measurements,	  quantifications	  and	  monitoring	  of	  forests	  
In order to create markets and commodities from forests services and goods 
not before included in traditional markets, then forests have to be measurable, 
quantifiable and monitored. UN-REDD says:  
 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to manage what is not measured 
(UNEP, 2011b, p. 23).  
 
 
However, the information is not the result of objective observations. The in-
formation is in itself a device, a technology, to make something amenable to 
interventions (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 283). REDD+ is performance-based 
which means that payments are delivered if one can prove that forest actions 
have increased carbon stocks or other forests benefits (UNEP, 2011b, p. 187, 
2014, p. 35). To do this hypothetical future scenario calculations based on 
historical trends of forests usage provide a baseline from which conservation 
actions can be calculated and evaluated over time. This is difficult and UN-
REDD is aware of the methodological problems: 
 
Within current limitations, establishing a baseline and time period 
for measuring the benefits of adaptation over the costs of not acting 
remain a challenge that must be met if REDD+ is to meet its poten-
tial (UNEP, 2014, p. 35) 
 
 
Hypothetically calculated baseline scenarios show that scientific results are 
actively created and not just collected facts. The focus is on how to make 
REDD+ realisable. Another technology that is vital is monitoring forests for 
possible changes in land use or forest area in order to make evaluations of 
e.g. carbon stocks (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 12). This is to be done by combin-
ing remote sensing technology with satellites and ground-based inventory, 
including participatory monitoring by local communities using GPS technol-
ogies (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 18, 2013b, p. 7).  
 
Reporting	  standards	  and	  methodological	  guidance	  
Reporting standards and methodological guidance are both management 
technologies supported by UN-REDD with the purpose of monitoring partic-
ipating countries in their scientific approaches. UN-REDD says that it wants 
to promote good scientific practice to improve the precision and accuracy of 
estimates and to create comparable methodologies (UN-REDD, 2013a, pp. 
12, 13). 
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   Reporting standards and methodological guidelines limit what is possible to 
express and to do and so they therefore define the subject's attributed role, 
what information it is supposed to provide, how to act and also define what 
information and knowledge that counts. UN-REDD articulates the require-
ments: 
 
To report these results, each country should collect information 
that allows a comprehensive assessment of the outcomes, including 
carbon stocks and other relevant information that a country may 
need to fulfil the information requirements under the UNFCCC 
(UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 11) 
 
 
UN-REDD often talks about the importance of respecting traditional 
knowledge of indigenous people (UNEP, 2011a, p. 14; UN-REDD, 2011a, p. 
6, 2012c, p. 2) but in practice REDD+ is built almost entirely on western ra-
tionality and knowledge production. The compatibility between traditional 
knowledge and western rationality is not discussed and western rationality 
and scientific worldviews are transmitted and imposed through these report-
ing standards and guidelines. Other forms of knowledge become devalued 
(Follér et al., 2013, p. 46). 
   Methodological guidance can also be interpreted as a way to ensure a prod-
uct that is trustworthy on a carbon market. Without this affirmation of good 
scientific practice the value of carbon credits could be challenged and then a 
market would collapse. This shows how the rationalities of scientization and 
marketization interconnect. UN-REDD writes: 
 
How to reliably account for the amount of forest carbon, including 
changes over time is the core monitoring challenge in REDD+, 
well defined in greenhouse gas (GHG) reporting standards and 
IPCC guidelines (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 8) 
 
 
According to UN-REDD NGOs could play a role here as verifiers of public 
information from forests protection projects, e.g. forest inventory data (UN-
REDD, 2013a, p. 19). This would further reassure the solidity and trustwor-
thiness of carbon estimates. 
   Reporting standards and methodological guidance includes both processes 
of responsibilization and de-responsibilization of subjects (Follér et al., 2013, 
pp. 48, 49). The subjects are responsible for implementing scientific designs 
practically, according to the guidelines, and for keeping track on their own 
scientific and methodological performance by sending reports higher up in 
the hierarchy. Simultaneously, they become less involved in the actual design 
of the programme since the very same reporting standards and methodologi-
cal guides already set the frame. These are often developed by international 
agencies such as the IPCC (the IPCC’s Good Practice Guidance or the 
Guidelines for National GHG Inventories) and the UNFCCC (UN-REDD, 
2011b, pp. 8, 9, 11). As an example of both responsibilization and de-
responsibilization UN-REDD says, on the same page:    
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Countries, based on their national circumstances and development 
priorities, need to exercise full control over the entire NFMS (Na-
tional Forest Monitoring System, authors note) development pro-
cess, assuming full responsibility for the implementation and effec-
tive operation of their NFMS  from Phases 1 to 3 of REDD+. 
 
Countries need to fully integrate REDD+ activities and their 
NFMS in accordance with their UNFCCC commitments (UN-
REDD, 2013a, p. 15) 
 
Methodological	  and	  technological	  training	  
Capacity building or training is vital to enable self-organizing subjects in 
forest monitoring and assessment. Again, this is a responsibilization of de-
veloping countries and local communities in the practical work of delivering 
and reassuring the "quality" of forest products and services in a REDD+ con-
text. Also again, it contains a role attribution of their part in REDD+. It is 
more about implementing than creating. UN-REDD says: 
 
Therefore, an important methodological exercise that countries 
should undertake in relation to monitoring for REDD+ is the har-
monization of existing forest monitoring tools and their integration 
with new tools (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 11) 
 
Technicians in MECNT were trained in 2011 on forest carbon 
measurements through a collaborative partnership between 
MECNT, the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), 
the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and FAO (UN-REDD, 
2013a, p. 8) (UN9:8) 
 
 
The citation above shows that civil society representatives, such as environ-
mental NGOs, participate in capacity building. Training is also directed at 
indigenous and local communities. UN-REDD says: 
 
 They have also shown that they can collect reliable data on the 
carbon contained in their forests, with minimal training" (UNEP, 
2014, p. 42) 
 
 
The articulation minimal training shows how capacity building links with 
role attribution and expectations from UN-REDD. The instrumental perspec-
tive is obvious.  
 
EMOs	  and	  scientization	  
The EMOs show an ambivalent relationship towards science and expertise. 
They refer to scientific results in many cases when arguing for their cause, 
but sometimes science is articulated as being part of the problem.   
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Challenging	  scientific	  objectivity	  
The EMOs challenge knowledge claims produced by expertise and technolo-
gies and show that objective knowledge and technology can work as trans-
mitters of other rationalities. The scientific representation of that to be gov-
erned is not a neutral reflection of reality but an inscription device to make a 
domain receptive to calculation and intervention (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 
283). Previous research shows how scientific uncertainties about climate 
governance are transformed in marketization processes (Stephan, 2012). Both 
FoE and SSNC say that there are great methodological problems in forest 
measurement. First, there is the difficulty of establishing a baseline from 
which deforestation mitigation can be measured and then there are problems 
making estimates using satellite surveillance since they cannot distinguish 
between natural forest and plantations, which has effects on both the amount 
of carbon that is stored and the biodiversity. Even if it were possible to moni-
tor forests there is always the risk that deforestation relocates to other areas 
or countries, so called leakage. Because the driving forces of deforestation 
are not dealt with, technologies are, in a sense, only treating the symptoms8 
(Möllersten, 2009, p. 94; Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 21; SSNC, 2011a, p. 
12). The EMOs not only criticise science on a technology level but also the 
underlying rationality of marketization and how it affects science in its appli-
cation in REDD+. The criticism implies that the role of science here is to 
make a carbon market possible by measurements and quantifications and to 
give it scientific credibility. SSNC says that the very rational behind these 
methods is to "reassure buyers that they get what they pay for" (SSNC, 2013, 
p. 7). SSNC continues and says that carbon credits is an imaginary commodi-
ty that:  
 
(...) requires actual and hypothetical emissions reductions to be 
treated as equal and interchangeable entities" (SSNC, 2013, p. 28) 
 
 
FoE expresses similar thoughts: 
 
Carbon trading involves the buying and selling of an artificial 
commodity, the right to emit greenhouse gases (FoE, 2011b, p. 1)  
 
Ambiguous	  participation	  
The EMOs quite often refer to scientific research and their involvement in 
scientific argumentation acknowledges the weight that scientific results carry 
in argumentations about environmental problems and thereby they participate 
in the scientization of climate governance. SSNC says: 
 
 If emissions continue to increase at a current rate, then science in-
dicates a big scale, and in worst case, self-increasing climate 
change (SSNC, 2011b, p. 4). 





At the same time SSNC reflects on what role science plays in environmental 
problems and solutions. They write that science, experts and developmental 
thinking in the modernisation process contributed, in a way, to the environ-
mental problems we have today. Nevertheless, science has produced indica-
tors, predictions and statistical material that could be utilized by the EM. The 
future, SSNC says, has become increasingly important for environmental 
protection. It is about protecting nature from the future scenarios that science 
presents9. FoE has a double relationship to science as well:  
 
 In an article in Science calculations are presented on how many 
years of warm-up from bio-fuels that is needed to compensate for 
altered land use (Möllersten, 2009, p. 48) 
 
 
Meanwhile FoE writes that: 
 
We are facing a challenge that cannot be solved by experts but only 
by many people together. A transformation that must be built on in-
sights about the needs of each and everyone and how local adapta-
tion can be achieved. A transformation were democratic coopera-
tion between people in general locally, nationally and internation-
ally is important (...)10 
 
 
This could be interpreted as if expert guidance should give way to democratic 
reasoning about what people in society want in general. It is more of a sys-
temic critique that seeks to challenge dominant structures set up by western 
rationality. 
   This ambivalence to science is yet another example of how the EMOs 
move between different levels of governmentality and how they try to bal-
ance pragmatic approaches with new perspectives that are not connected to 
dominant structures. SSNC emphasize the pragmatic side while FoE has 
more of a systemic critique, although the difference should not be exaggerat-
ed.  
 
The	  rationality	  of	  managerialization	  
Managerialization is the rationality of how to direct subjects in desirable 
ways by making them aware of their behaviour in relation to certain norms, 
values and objectives, and to provide devices on how to get themselves from 
one state to the other (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 285). This way it is possible to 
govern at a distance without encroachment on personal freedom. In UN-
REDD proposals there is evidence of the extensive use of management tech-
nologies with the aim of assisting agents in identifying their weaknesses in 
relation to REDD+ preparations (UN-REDD, 2012a, p. 7, 2012b, p. 2). 
 





Guidelines	  and	  assessments	  
Guidelines as a technology declare the objectives that are desired or expected 
and instructions on how subjects should act in order to become self-
organizing in the implementation of these objectives. UN-REDD writes: 
 
The Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) template contains 
specific guidelines to assist a REDD+ Country to organize itself to 
become ready for REDD+" (UN-REDD, 2012c, p. 4)  
 
 
The citation above mentions templates which are a limited version of reality. 
The designers of the guidelines are in control of what reality should be repre-
sented, making other perspectives invisible. Assessments are similar to guide-
lines but use guidance that is more implicit. Assessments identify the breach 
between where subjects are and where they should be. This may induce 
agents to "calibrate" themselves and become self-regulating according to the 
implied norms that assessments carry. UN-REDD says: 
 
A major country needs assessment carried out in 2012 jointly by 
the UNREDD Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Fa-
cility (FCPF) found that ‘very urgent’ support was needed in 52% 
of countries for the identification of major inconsistencies between 
the objectives of the REDD+ strategy and other sectors (...) 
(UNEP, 2014, p. 25) 
 
 
With guidelines and assessments, countries are made accountable and re-
sponsible for the implementation of the programme and for their own per-
formance, made visible by the assessments, but they play a minor role in the 
construction of the management tools. Those creating the management tools 
and having the authority to apply them are less responsible and less account-
able, even though they set the objectives. They often articulate themselves as 
supporters, providing intellectual and material devices helping developing 
countries adapt to REDD+, not as governors. UN-REDD says: 
 
The Programme is responsive to country needs, and is prepared to 
support the transformation in the forest sector and other sectors 
that impact land use in developing country economies needed to 
achieve readiness for REDD+ (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 1) 
  
Capacity	  building	  
Capacity building or empowerment is often articulated with ideals such as 
freedom or liberation, but the governance perspective is less discussed. Ca-
pacity building is not the facilitation of capacities in general but rather certain 
capacities connected to specific rationalities and objectives. Empowered sub-
jects are not liberated from power relations, but put in particular kinds of 
power relations, with specific forms of knowledge and expertise (Dean, 2010, 
pp. 83, 86; Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008, p. 374). It is often the one who em-
powers that defines what sort of capacity building is needed and for what 
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reasons - based on their rationalities, forms of knowledge and conceptions 
about those whose well being they consider mandated to enhance. UN-REDD 
says about indigenous people: 
 
Certain stakeholders may require capacity building or training in 
advance of a consultation to ensure that their understanding of the 
issues and ability to contribute are sufficient; this need should be 
identified in the terms of the consultation (step #4 above). The 
awareness and capacity of indigenous peoples and forest-
dependent communities to engage with REDD+ discussions should 
be assessed with the use of questionnaires, surveys, focus group 
discussions, and/or workshops (UN-REDD, 2012c, p. 10) 
 
 
Here UN-REDD relies on several management technologies to assess wheth-
er stakeholders are able enough to participate and contribute sufficiently in 
REDD+. Miller and Rose write that power today is not so much a matter of 
constraining citizens but rather making them capable of bearing a regulated 
freedom (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 53). It is constructed with incentives and 
enough freedom to engage subjects in self-governance and enough re-
strictions to guide them in the desired directions. It is apparent that capacity 
building has an instrumental dimension to it and governments and indigenous 
communities have to become capable in order to exercise their freedom and 
their responsibilities, in accordance with the objectives of the programme.  
 
EMOs	  and	  managerialization	  
The EMOs do not oppose the rationality of managerialization in itself and 
their critique is aimed more at other levels. EMOs resistance focuses on man-
agement technologies such as safeguards, procedural guidelines and capacity 
building that are designed to ensure participation from local and indigenous 
communities and how consultations with these groups function in reality.  
 
Insufficient	  tools	  and	  corrupted	  execution	  
Effective participation by indigenous people and other local communities are 
widely promoted by different REDD+ agents, including UN-REDD but the 
EMOs criticise how it works in practice. SSNC is concerned with specific 
management technologies and how they are designed. SSNC write that 
standards for Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)11 for local groups do 
not provide sufficient operational guidance for deciding what is an acceptable 
FPIC process, how rights holders must be allowed to define a process and 
that they lack definitions of concepts like equity or what constitutes a group. 
SSNC says that information and capacity building has been limited in some 
pilot projects due to a condescending view of indigenous people. On the re-
viewed projects that SSNC has looked at this has lead to the approval of pro-
jects at the expense of community interests according to SSNC (SSNC, 2013, 
                                                
11According to UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, states 
should seek free prior and informed consent before decisions affecting indig-
enous people.http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf 
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pp. 6, 7, 26, 27). FoE expresses comparable thoughts and say that the safe-
guards decided at COP16 in Cancun, referred to by UN-REDD, is a watered 
down text that is to weak to guarantee the rights of indigenous and local 
communities (FoE, 2011a, p. 8).  
   FoE adds implicit criticism on a rationality level saying that the rationality 
of marketization corrupts the execution of management technologies for se-
curing stakeholder participation. FoE says that in practice governments only 
pay lip service to community rights (FoE, 2010, p. 21). They refer to studies 
showing that indigenous people are struggling to participate in consultations 
and other relevant processes. Information about meetings, background mate-
rial, economic and administrative support has, in many cases, been inade-
quate. FoE describes it partly as an effect of investors wanting to hurry the 
deal making process and skip already agreed consultations and governments 
wanting to avoid critique against the implementation of REDD+ and carbon 
markets. FoE even accuses large environmental NGOs of participating in 
national dialogues that exclude communities and organizations critical to 
REDD+ (FoE, 2010, pp. 4, 15–18; Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, pp. 10, 25). 
FoE tries to illuminate how the rationality of marketization interferes and 
how other rationalities and technologies are used in the service of marketiza-
tion or affected by marketization, as with the case of science above.  
 
Participation	  in	  managerialization:	  capacity	  building	  	  
The EMOs express a will to empower both governments and local communi-
ties in developing countries but compared to UN-REDD they seem to focus 
on capacity building that provide tools for critically examining REDD+ pro-
posals. SSNC write that it is fundamental to ensure that affected communities 
not only have sufficient access to information, but relevant capacity that al-
lows them to properly assess proposals before negotiations (SSNC, 2013, p. 
26). FoE says that they work to educate local communities in democracy, 
human rights and organization in order to influence decision makers12. This 
is perhaps more about liberating empowerment, but the EMOs also show 
instrumental intentions towards indigenous and local communities. SSNC 
says:  
  
To acknowledge the local communities and indigenous peoples 
tenure rights, and give them support to manage forests, has shown 
to be the one of the most effective methods to protect and restore 
forests (SSNC, 2011a, p. 19).  
 
It is important to note that tenure rights and support to indigenous people is 
articulated as a method to protect forests and in a similar way FoE writes that 
studies have shown that tenure rights for indigenous people leads to preserva-
tion of the forests (Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 9). Here, they share the 
same tactics as UN-REDD. Both these examples show empowerment from a 
governance perspective. The EMOs' thoughts about capacity building are 
partly about having people perform certain desirable actions to achieve spe-
cific goals according to ones rationalities. Both EMOs and local communities 
                                                
12 http://www.jordensvanner.se/vad-vi-gor/regnskog 
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have interests in preserving forests so the EMOs would probably describe it 
as a win-win situation.  
Conclusion	  
So, what rationalities and technologies can be found in contemporary global 
climate governance? Marketization is the major rationality permeating UN-
REDD proposals. It is about creating economic incentives by pricing forest 
services previously not included in traditional markets. This is very much in 
line with ALG and how to transform political responsibilities into market 
principles. The technology of commodification provides thinkable products 
needed for a marketization of forests and translation devices merge economic 
growth and environmental concerns into the concept of green economy that 
tries to disarm earlier oppositions between these objectives. Together with 
the creation of entrepreneurial actors you will have self-organizing actors 
with a minimum of public and political debate on forest management.  
   Scientization provides a rationality of legitimacy and objectivity that, as 
with marketization, de-politizes climate governance since scientific objectivi-
ty seems more legitimate than political subjectivity. It also provides technical 
devices and processes for creating a REDD+ programme in practice. Without 
technologies to create measurable units, there would be no carbon market. To 
ensure scientific procedures, participants have to be guided and trained in 
order to produce a credible market product such as carbon units. In this way, 
they also become responsible and accountable for implementation and deliv-
erance. It is important to see how the different rationalities and technologies 
are interconnected. REDD+ is a knowledge intensive construction for climate 
governance and it highlights the prominence of assemblages in its develop-
ment (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 275). A complex creation such as REDD+ 
shows that ALG is not about de-regulation, often connected to neo-liberal 
thoughts, but rather a re-regulation according to other rationalities.    
   Managerialization is the rationality of how to govern by utilizing subjects’ 
freedom and capacity to govern themselves by making them aware of their 
behaviour in relation to desirable objectives. Guidelines and assessments are 
technologies that will put focus on the gap between subjects’ current state 
and the desirable state. With guidelines and assessments, subjects become 
responsible for implementation and control of their own performance but 
with little control over what to implement or assess. If necessary subjects are 
provided capacity building in order to perform their responsibilities that 
comes with their attributed roles in REDD+.  
   When comparing the result to previous research I find both similarities and 
differences. Also, some confirmations can be made. Bäckstrand and Lö-
vbrand (2006) describe EMod and GE - that can be translated to marketiza-
tion and scientization - as the dominant discourses in climate governance. 
UN-REDD seems to also incorporate what Bäckstrand and Lövbrand call 
reformative CE, described as a critical counter-discourse. UN-REDD talk 
about the importance of a public-private partnership between business, gov-
ernments and NGOs in reaching result-based problem solving, and this is 
integrated into the rationality of marketization. Boström asks if one can talk 
about a paradigm shift in national level public environmental care towards 
supporting self-regulation (Boström, 2001, p. 316). This study cannot say 
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anything about the national level but in REDD+ the answer is definitely yes. 
The role attributed governments and politics in REDD+ is to be the enabler 
of a marketization, which means self-governing, responsible and accountable 
entrepreneurs disciplined by market principles. 
   The second research question was how the EMOs relate to REDD+ ration-
alities and technologies. The advantage of looking at resistance on different 
levels is that it provides a more detailed account of participation and re-
sistance among EMOs. Marketization brings forward the biggest resistance 
among the EMOs and concerns the role of politics and markets in climate 
governance, and what should be the major coordinating factor. Both EMOs 
advocate political solutions and public funding but they differ on the political 
form. SSNC emphasizes centralized political institutions like the UN and 
aims more for a reformation of the system. It considers market solutions suit-
able as long as political forces can control them. FoE has an outspoken re-
sistance against neo-liberalism and global corporations and expresses ideas 
about local democracy and building new political forms from below, con-
nected with global movements. This seems to be more of a systemic critique. 
At the same time, they to talk about solutions that must be interpreted as cen-
tralized solutions e.g. taxes on financial transactions and public funding of 
climate governance. The EMOs' critique of economic methods is on a tech-
nology level which is a form of resistance. However, on a rationality level it 
simultaneously confirms the importance of economic knowledge in environ-
mental debates. These are examples of institutionalization that previous re-
search talked about (Jamison, 2001; Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, 
forthcoming).  
   There are also shifting perspectives with regard to scientization. Both 
EMOs refer to scientific results and therefore recognize scientific knowledge 
but they also show that science can work as a device for translating rationali-
ties into realities. Claims of scientific objectivity and legitimacy can not be 
taken for granted and must always be understood in relation to context, which 
previous research also demonstrates (Stephan, 2012). This shows an ambigui-
ty on a rationality level. Although sometimes critical to the scientization of 
society SSNC emphasize the importance of scientific scenarios in contempo-
rary environmental protection. FoE is more sceptical and their articulations 
about expertise can be interpreted as a critique against the dominant role of 
experts and instead propose that democracy and people’s needs should guide 
social development.  
   Regarding managerialization both EMOs criticise the design of the tech-
nologies used to ensure local community participation. They are not detailed 
enough to work as guidance for acceptable processes. FoE also talks about 
how the rationality of marketization corrupts the use of safeguards and how 
business, governments and even certain NGOs take part in this. SSNC and 
FoE express a will to empower. Their capacity building is partly aimed at 
local communities in order to provide tools for critically examining REDD+ 
proposals. They also show governing intentions with their capacity building. 
Clear tenure rights and support to manage forests is described as the best 
method to protect forests. Thus, capacity building is also about influencing 
behaviour through management.  
   This study comprises only two Swedish EMOs so one should be careful in 
making generalizations. However, being two important and diverse organiza-
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tions, the result is most certainly a strong indicator about the opinion range in 
the Swedish EM. 
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